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Abstract: Recently, two certificateless three-party authenticated key
agreement protocols were proposed, and both protocols were claimed they
can meet the desirable security properties including forward security, key
compromise impersonation resistance and so on. Through cryptanalysis, we
show that one neither meets forward security and key compromise imperson-
ation resistance nor resists an attack by an adversary who knows all users’
secret values, and the other cannot resist key compromise impersonation
attack. Finally, we propose improved protocols to make up two original pro-
tocols’ security weaknesses, respectively. Further security analysis shows that
our improved protocols can remove such security weaknesses.
Key words: key compromise impersonation attack; forward security;
three-party; certificateless authenticated key agreement; bilinear pairings
1. Introduction
Authenticated key agreement (AKA) is one of the fundamental crypto-
graphic primitives. It allows two or more users to generate a shared session
secret key over an open network with each other, and all the users are as-
sured that only their intended peers can know the shared session secret key.
AKA protocols can be realized in the traditional public-key infrastructure
(PKI) setting, identity-based cryptography setting [1], or certificateless cryp-
tography setting [2]. Certificateless authenticated key agreement (CLAKA)
protocols would be more appealing due to its advantages in eliminating the
heavy certificate management burden in PKI-based AKA protocols and key
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escrow problem in identity-based AKA protocols. By far, many researchers
have been investigating secure and efficient certificateless two-party authen-
ticated key agreement protocols (e.g., [3–12]). A research direction in AKA
protocol aims to generalize two-party AKA setting to multi-party AKA set-
ting, among which the three-party AKA protocols receive much interest. In
2009, Gao et al. [13] proposed the first three-party CLAKA protocol. Since
then, several three-party CLAKA protocols (e.g., [14], the XCQ-11 protocol
[15], the XCL-12 protocol [16]) have been proposed.
In this paper, we analyze two three-party CLAKA protocols [15, 16] and
propose two improved protocols. Firstly, we point out that the XCQ-11
protocol [15] is subjected to three attacks including forward security attack,
key compromise impersonation attack, and an attack by adversaries who
know all users’ secret values, and then propose a simple improvement to
remove these flaws. Secondly, we find that the XCL-12 protocol [16] cannot
resist key compromise impersonation attack and propose an efficient protocol
which can resist this attack.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Some preliminar-
ies are introduced in Section 2. A review and three attacks and an improved
protocol of the XCQ-11 protocol are given in Section 3. A review and two
attacks and an improved protocol of the XCL-12 protocol are given in Section
4. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
We now briefly review some basic concepts used in this paper, including
bilinear pairings and some security properties.
2.1. Bilinear pairing
Let G1 be an additive group generated by P with prime order q and G2
be a multiplicative group of the same order. A map eˆ : G1×G1 → G2 is said
to be a bilinear pairing if the following three conditions hold true:
1. Bilinearity: for all a, b ∈ Z∗q , eˆ(aP, bP ) = eˆ(P, P )
ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: eˆ(P, P ) 6= 1G2.
3. Computability: eˆ is efficiently computable.
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2.2. Security properties
It is desirable for three-party authenticated key agreement protocols to
possess the following security properties. Let A, B and C be three partici-
pants that execute the protocol correctly.
• Known-key security: The session key is not compromised in the face of
adversaries who have learned some other session keys.
• Key compromise impersonation (KCI) resistance: If an adversary
reveals A’s long-term private key, the adversary cannot impersonate any
other participant to A without the participant’s private key.
• Forward secrecy (FS): Compromising of long-term private keys of one
or more of the participants should not affect the secrecy of previously es-
tablished session keys. A protocol has forward secrecy if the secrecy of
previously established session keys is not affected when some but not all of
the participants’ long-term private keys are corrupted. A protocol has per-
fect forward secrecy if the secrecy of previously established session keys is
not affected when all participants’ long-term private keys are compromised.
• Unknown key share (UKS) resistance: If one participant A thinks
that he/she is sharing a key with the other participants (e.g., B and C),
then it should not happen that A is actually sharing that key with the
adversary, which is not B or C.
3. The XCQ-11 protocol and its analysis and improvement
In this section, we first review the XCQ-11 protocol [15], then give three
attacks on the XCQ-11 protocol, and finally propose a simple countermeasure
to resist these attacks.
3.1. Review of the XCQ-11 protocol
The XCQ-11 protocol [15] requires a KGC and consists of four phases:
system setup, partial key extraction, user key generation and key agreement
phases.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k ∈ Z, the algorithm works as follows.
(1) It runs the parameter generator on input k to generate a prime q, two
groups G1,G2 of prime order q, a generator P of G1, and an admissible
pairing eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2.
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(2) It chooses a master-key x ∈ Z∗q and computes P0 = xP .
(3) It chooses three cryptographic secure hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗ →
Z∗q, H2 : G1 → Z
∗
q and H3 : {0, 1}
∗3 × G91 × G2 → {0, 1}
k. Fi-
nally the KGC’s master-key x is kept secret and the system parameters
{q,G1,G2, eˆ, P, P0, H1, H2, H3} are published.
• PartialKeyGen: Given a user’s identity IDU ∈ {0, 1}
∗, KGC first chooses
at random qU = H1(IDU). It then sets this user’s partial private key
sU =
1
x+qU
P and transmits it to user IDU secretly.
It is easy to see sU is actually a signature on IDU for the key pair (P0, x),
and user IDU can check its correctness by checking whether eˆ(sU , P0 +
qUP ) = eˆ(P, P ). For convenience, here we define QU = P0 + qUP .
• UserKeyGen: User IDU picks randomly xU ∈ Z
∗
q as his/her user secret
key uskU , and computes his/her public key as upkU = xUQU . After that,
the user IDU computes the full private key SU =
1
xU+H2(upkU )
sU .
• Key Agreement: Assume that an entity A with identity IDA has full
private key SA and public key upkA, an entity B with identity IDB has
private key SB and public key upkB, and an entity C with identity IDC has
private key SC and public key upkC. The message flows and computations
of a protocol run are described below.
(1) A,B,C: choose a, b, c ∈ Z∗q .
(2) A→ B : TAB = a(upkB +H2(upkB)QB),
A→ C : TAC = a(upkC +H2(upkC)QC),
B → A : TBA = b(upkA +H2(upkA)QA),
B → C : TBC = b(upkC +H2(upkC)QC),
C → A : TCA = c(upkA +H2(upkA)QA),
C → B : TCB = c(upkB +H2(upkB)QB).
(3) A : kA = eˆ(P, P )
aeˆ(TBA, SA)eˆ(TCA, SA) = eˆ(P, P )
a+b+c,
B : kB = eˆ(P, P )
beˆ(TAB, SB)eˆ(TCB, SB) = eˆ(P, P )
a+b+c,
C : kC = eˆ(P, P )
ceˆ(TAC , SC)eˆ(TBC , SC) = eˆ(P, P )
a+b+c.
After the protocol has finished, all three entities share the session key,
which is computed as
K = H3(IDA||IDB||IDC ||upkA||upkB||upkC||TAB||TAC ||TBA||TBC ||TCA||TCB||
eˆ(P, P )a+b+c).
3.2. Failure to provide forward secrecy
Suppose that A’s long-term private key SA and B’s long-term private
key SB have been compromised. In the following, we show that an adver-
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sary A with the knowledge SA and SB can obtain previously established
session keys. Assume adversary A has eavesdropped the transferred mes-
sages TBA, TCA, TAB, TCB, TAC and TBC . From the values TBA, TAB, TCA, SA
and SB, adversary A can compute k = eˆ(TAB, SB)eˆ(TBA, SA)eˆ(TCA, SA) =
eˆ(P, P )a+b+c from which he can construct the session key. Thus the XCQ-11
protocol cannot provide forward secrecy.
3.3. KCI attack by a common adversary
Suppose that A’s long-term private key SA and B’s long-term private
key SB have been compromised. Obviously, A is now able to impersonate
the corrupted party to any other party. However, it is also desirable that
knowledge of the full private key does not enable A to impersonate other
entities to the corrupted party. Accordingly, in a three-party key agreement
protocol, a KCI attack can be an attack whereby A, with A’s long-term
private key and B’s long-term private key at hand, attempts to establish a
valid session key with A and B by masquerading as another legitimate entity
(say C).
A detailed description of KCI attack by a common adversary against the
XCQ-11 protocol is outlined below (A(C) denotes that A is impersonating
C).
(1) A,B,A(C): choose a, b, c′ ∈ Z∗q .
(2) A→ B : TAB = a(upkB +H2(upkB)QB),
A→ A(C) : TAC = a(upkC +H2(upkC)QC),
B → A : TBA = b(upkA +H2(upkA)QA),
B → A(C) : TBC = b(upkC +H2(upkC)QC),
A(C)→ A : TCA = c
′(upkA +H2(upkA)QA),
A(C)→ B : TCB = c
′(upkB +H2(upkB)QB).
(3) A and B compute the session key according to the protocol specification.
A(C) computes the session key as follows.
kA(C) = eˆ(P, P )
c′ eˆ(TAB, SB)eˆ(TBA, SA) = eˆ(P, P )
a+b+c′.
K = H3(IDA||IDB||IDC||upkA||upkB||upkC||TAB||TAC||TBA||TBC ||TCA||TCB||
eˆ(P, P )a+b+c
′
)
So A successfully agrees a session key K with entity A and B while A and B
believes he is sharing the key with entity C. Thus KCI attack by a common
adversary is successful.
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3.4. An attack by an adversary who knows all users’ secret values
An adversary who knows all users’ secret values can compute the session
key of the XCQ-11 protocol with the following method.
From the values TAB, TAC , TBA, TBC , TCA, TCB, upkA, upkB, upkC , qA, qB, qC , xA, xB
and xC , the adversary can compute the following three points
aP = 1
qB−qC
( 1
xB+H2(upkB)
TAB −
1
xC+H2(upkC)
TAC)
= 1
qB−qC
( 1
xB+H2(upkB)
a(xB +H2(upkB))QB
− 1
xC+H2(upkC)
a(xC +H2(upkC))QC)
= 1
qB−qC
(aQB − aQC)
= 1
qB−qC
(qB − qC)aP
bP = 1
qA−qC
( 1
xA+H2(upkA)
TBA −
1
xC+H2(upkC)
TBC)
cP = 1
qA−qB
( 1
xA+H2(upkA)
TCA −
1
xB+H2(upkB)
TCB).
Then the adversary can compute k = eˆ(aP + bP + cP, P ) = eˆ(P, P )a+b+c
from which he can obtain the session key.
3.5. Our improvement
The reason why the XCQ-11 protocol can suffer from the above three
attacks is that it lacks message origin authentication in the XCQ-11 protocol.
To make up security weaknesses, we give a simple improvement which uses
signatures to achieve message origin authentication and has the same design
idea as protocols [14, 17].
• Setup: This phase is the same as that in Section 3.1 except that a se-
cure signature scheme from pairings is chosen and H3 is modified to H3 :
{0, 1}∗3 ×G61 ×G2 → {0, 1}
k.
• PartialKeyGen and UserKeyGen: These two phases are the same as
those in Section 3.1.
• Key Agreement: This phase is the same as that in Section 3.1 except
that the following message flows and computations of a protocol run.
(1) A,B,C: choose a, b, c ∈ Z∗q .
(2) A → B,C : {TA = aP, σA}, where σA is the signature on TA and upkA
under A’s full private key SA.
B → A,C : {TB = bP, σB}, where σB is the signature on TB and upkB
under B’s full private key SB.
C → A,B : {TC = cP, σC}, where σC is the signature on TC and upkC
under C’s full private key SC .
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(3) A verifies the validity of σB and σC . If both are valid, A computes
kA = eˆ(TB, TC)
a.
B verifies the validity of σA and σC . If both are valid, B computes
kB = eˆ(TA, TC)
b.
C verifies the validity of σA and σB. If both are valid, C computes
kC = eˆ(TA, TB)
c.
After the protocol has finished, all three entities share the session key, which
is computed as
K = H3(IDA||IDB||IDC ||upkA||upkB||upkC||TA||TB||TC ||eˆ(P, P )
abc).
With this modification, the improved protocol can withstand the above
attacks. Reasons are easily described as follows.
The resulting session key of our improved protocol is independent of the
participants’ full private keys as the full private keys are used only to gen-
erate signatures. That is to say, compromising the full private keys of all
participants is no help to compute the session key. Hence, the improved
protocol provides perfect forward secrecy and resist the attack described in
Section 3.4. Furthermore, an adversary who wants to impersonate a user
must generate a correct signature, however, he cannot generate a correct sig-
nature without the user’s full private key. Thus the improved protocol can
resist KCI attack by a common adversary.
4. The XCL-12 protocol and its analysis and improvement
In this section, we first review the XCL-12 protocol [16], then show that
the XCL-12 protocol is vulnerable to two types of KCI attacks, and finally
propose an efficient countermeasure to resist these attacks.
4.1. Review of the XCL-12 protocol
The XCL-12 protocol [16] is described as follows.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k ∈ Z, the algorithm works as follows.
(1) It runs the parameter generator on input k to generate a prime q, two
groups G1,G2 of prime order q, a generator P of G1, and an admissible
pairing eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2.
(2) It chooses a master-key x ∈ Z∗q and computes P0 = xP .
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(3) It chooses two cryptographic secure hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗×G1 →
Z∗q andH2 : {0, 1}
∗3×G101 ×G
2
2 → {0, 1}
k. Finally the KGC’s master-key
x is kept secret and the system parameters {q,G1,G2, eˆ, P, P0, H1, H2}
are published.
• PartialKeyGen: Given a user’s identity IDU ∈ {0, 1}
∗, KGC first chooses
at random rU ∈ Z
∗
q , and computes RU = rUP, h = H1(IDU ||RU), and
sU = (rU + hx)
−1. It then sets this user’s partial private key {sU , RU} and
transmits it to user IDU secretly.
It is easy to see that user IDU can validate his/her partial private key by
checking whether the equation sU(RU +H1(IDU ||RU)P0) = P holds. The
partial key is valid if the equation holds, and vice versa.
• UserKeyGen: User IDU picks randomly xU ∈ Z
∗
q as his/her user secret
key uskU , and computes his/her public key as upkU = xUP .
• Key Agreement: Assume that an entity A with identity IDA has full
private key (sA, RA, xA) and public key upkA, an entity B with identity
IDB has private key (sB, RB, xB) and public key upkB, and an entity C
with identity IDC has private key (sC , RC , xC) and public key upkC. The
message flows and computations of a protocol run are described below.
(1) A,B,C: choose a, b, c ∈ Z∗q .
(2) A→ B,C : {IDA, upkA, RA}
B → A : {IDB, upkB, RB, TBA = b(RA +H1(IDA||RA)P0)}
C → A : {IDC , upkC, RC , TCA = c(RA +H1(IDA||RA)P0)}
A→ B : TAB = a(RB +H1(IDB||RB)P0)
A→ C : TAC = a(RC +H1(IDC ||RC)P0)
B → C : {IDB, upkB, RB}
C → B : {IDC , upkC, RC , TCB = c(RB +H1(IDB||RB)P0)}
B → C : TBC = b(RC +H1(IDC ||RC)P0).
(3) A computes:
k1ABC = aP + sATBA + sATCA = aP + bP + cP = (a + b+ c)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sATBA, sATCA)
a = eˆ(bP, cP )a = eˆ(P, P )abc
k3ABC = eˆ(upkB, upkC)
xA = eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC .
B computes:
k1ABC = bP + sBTAB + sBTCB = bP + aP + cP = (a+ b+ c)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sBTAB, sBTCB)
b = eˆ(aP, cP )b = eˆ(P, P )abc
k3ABC = eˆ(upkA, upkC)
xB = eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC .
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C computes:
k1ABC = cP + sCTAC + sCTBC = cP + aP + bP = (a+ b+ c)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sCTAC , sCTBC)
c = eˆ(aP, bP )c = eˆ(P, P )abc
k3ABC = eˆ(upkA, upkB)
xC = eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC .
After the protocol has finished, all three entities share the session key,
which is computed as
K = H2(IDA||IDB||IDC ||upkA||upkB||upkC||TAB||TAC ||TBA||TBC ||TCA||TCB||
(a+ b+ c)P ||eˆ(P, P )abc||eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC ).
4.2. KCI attack by a malicious KGC
Suppose the full private key (sA, RA, xA) of an entity A is compromised by
a malicious KGC (say E). Obviously, E is now able to impersonate the cor-
rupted party to any other party. However, it is also desirable that knowledge
of the full private key does not enable E to impersonate other entities to the
corrupted party. Accordingly, in a three-party key agreement protocol, a KCI
attack can be an attack whereby E , with A’s long-term private key at hand,
attempts to establish a valid session key with A and B by masquerading as
another legitimate entity (say C).
A detailed description of KCI attack by a malicious attack against the
XCL-12 protocol is outlined below (E(C) denotes that E is impersonating C).
We note that a malicious KGC knows the partial key (sC , RC) of C since the
user’s partial key is generated by him, however, he cannot know the secret
value xC of C.
(1) A,B, E(C): choose a, b, c′ ∈ Z∗q .
(2) A→ B, E(C) : {IDA, upkA, RA}
B → A : {IDB, upkB, RB, TBA = b(RA +H1(IDA||RA)P0)}
E(C)→ A : {IDC, upkC, RC , TCA = c
′(RA +H1(IDA||RA)P0)}
A→ B : TAB = a(RB +H1(IDB||RB)P0)
A→ E(C) : TAC = a(RC +H1(IDC ||RC)P0)
B → E(C) : {IDB, upkB, RB}
E(C)→ B : {IDC, upkC, RC , TCB = c
′(RB +H1(IDB||RB)P0)}
B → E(C) : TBC = b(RC +H1(IDC ||RC)P0).
(3) A and B compute the session key according to the protocol specification.
E(C) computes the session key as follows.
k1ABC = c
′P + sCTAC + sATBA = c
′P + aP + bP = (a+ b+ c′)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sCTAC , sATBA)
c′ = eˆ(aP, bP )c
′
= eˆ(P, P )abc
′
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k3ABC = eˆ(upkB, upkC)
xA = eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC
K = H2(IDA||IDB||IDC||upkA||upkB||upkC||TAB||TAC||TBA||TBC ||TCA||TCB||
(a+ b+ c′)P ||eˆ(P, P )abc
′
||eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC).
So E successfully agrees a session key K with entity A and B while A and B
believes he is sharing the key with entity C. Thus KCI attack by a malicious
KGC is successful.
4.3. KCI Attack by a common adversary
Suppose that A’s full private key (sA, RA, xA) and B’s full private key
(sB, RB, xB) have been compromised. Obviously, A is now able to imperson-
ate the corrupted party to any other party. However, it is also desirable that
knowledge of the full private key does not enable A to impersonate other
entities to the corrupted party. Accordingly, in a three-party key agreement
protocol, a KCI attack can be an attack whereby A, with A’s long-term pri-
vate key and B’s long-term private key at hand, attempts to establish a valid
session key with A and B by masquerading as another legitimate entity (say
C).
A detailed description of KCI attack by a common adversary against the
XCL-12 protocol is outlined below (A(C) denotes that A is impersonating
C).
(1) A,B,A(C): choose a, b, c′′ ∈ Z∗q .
(2) A→ B,A(C) : {IDA, upkA, RA}
B → A : {IDB, upkB, RB, TBA = b(RA +H1(IDA||RA)P0)}
A(C)→ A : {IDC, upkC, RC , TCA = c
′′(RA +H1(IDA||RA)P0)}
A→ B : TAB = a(RB +H1(IDB||RB)P0)
A→ A(C) : TAC = a(RC +H1(IDC ||RC)P0)
B → A(C) : {IDB, upkB, RB}
A(C)→ B : {IDC, upkC, RC , TCB = c
′′(RB +H1(IDB||RB)P0)}
B → A(C) : TBC = b(RC +H1(IDC ||RC)P0).
(3) A and B compute the session key according to the protocol specification.
A(C) computes the session key as follows.
k1ABC = c
′′P + sBTAB + sATBA = c
′′P + aP + bP = (a + b+ c′′)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sBTAB, sATBA)
c′′ = eˆ(aP, bP )c
′′
= eˆ(P, P )abc
′′
k3ABC = eˆ(upkB, upkC)
xA = eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC
K = H2(IDA||IDB||IDC||upkA||upkB||upkC||TAB||TAC||TBA||TBC ||TCA||TCB||
(a+ b+ c′)P ||eˆ(P, P )abc
′
||eˆ(P, P )xAxBxC).
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So A successfully agrees a session key K with entity A and B while A and B
believes he is sharing the key with entity C. Thus KCI attack by a common
adversary is successful.
4.4. Our improvement
Informally saying, the XCQ-12 protocol cannot resist two types of KCI
attacks is because the inappropriate design of shared values k1ABC , k
2
ABC and
k3ABC makes that the session key does not depend on all three parties’ partial
private keys, secret values, and ephemeral secrets. To make up the security
weaknesses, we give an efficient improvement as follows which modifies the
three shared values.
• Setup,PartialKeyGen and UserKeyGen: These three phases are the
same as those in Section 4.1.
• Key Agreement: This phase is the same as that in Section 4.1 except
that the following computations.
A computes
k1ABC = aP + sATBA + sATCA = aP + bP + cP = (a + b+ c)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sATBA+RB+H1(IDB||RB)P0, sATCA+RC+H1(IDC ||RC)P0)
a+s−1
A
= eˆ(P, P )(a+s
−1
A
)(b+s−1
B
)(c+s−1
C
)
k3ABC = eˆ(sATBA + upkB, sATCA + upkC)
a+xA = eˆ(P, P )(a+xA)(b+xB)(c+xC)
B computes
k1ABC = bP + sBTAB + sBTCB = bP + aP + cP = (a+ b+ c)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sBTAB+RA+H1(IDA||RA)P0, sBTCB+RC+H1(IDC ||RC)P0)
b+s−1
B
= eˆ(P, P )(a+s
−1
A
)(b+s−1
B
)(c+s−1
C
)
k3ABC = eˆ(sBTAB + upkA, sBTCB + upkC)
b+xB = eˆ(P, P )(a+xA)(b+xB)(c+xC)
C computes
k1ABC = cP + sCTAC + sCTBC = cP + aP + bP = (a+ b+ c)P
k2ABC = eˆ(sCTAC+RA+H1(IDA||RA)P0, sCTBC+RB+H1(IDB||RB)P0)
c+s−1
C
= eˆ(P, P )(a+s
−1
A
)(b+s−1
B
)(c+s−1
C
)
k3ABC = eˆ(sCTAC + upkA, sCTBC + upkB)
c+xC = eˆ(P, P )(a+xA)(b+xB)(c+xC).
After the protocol has finished, all three entities share the session key, which
is computed as
K = H2(IDA||IDB||IDC ||upkA||upkB||upkC||TAB||TAC ||TBA||TBC ||TCA||TCB||
(a + b+ c)P ||eˆ(P, P )(a+s
−1
A
)(b+s−1
B
)(c+s−1
C
)||eˆ(P, P )(a+xA)(b+xB)(c+xC)).
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With this modification, the improved protocol can withstand two types
of KCI attacks due to the following reasons.
As we know, a malicious KGC can know partial private keys (sA, RA),(sB, RB)
and (sC , RC). Suppose the full private key (sA, RA, xA) of an entity A is com-
promised by a malicious KGC. Then if he want to impersonate C to A and
B, he would have to compute k3ABC = eˆ(sCTAC + xAP, sCTBC + upkB)
c′+xC .
However, without the knowledge of a and xC , the malicious KGC cannot
compute k3ABC since he must know b and xB which is not permitted.
Suppose that A’s full private key (sA, RA, xA) and B’s full private key
(sB, RB, xB) have been compromised by an adversary A. Then if he want to
impersonate C to A and B, he would have to compute k2ABC = eˆ(sBTAB +
s−1A P, sATBA+ s
−1
A P )
c′′+s−1
C and k3ABC = eˆ(sBTAB +xAP, sATBA+xBP )
c′′+xC .
However, without the knowledge of a and b, A cannot compute k2ABC and
k3ABC since he must know sC and xC which is not permitted.
Furthermore, our improved protocol is as efficient as the XCQ-12 protocol
since only 4 point additions are increased.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have indicated that Xiong et al.’s protocol [15] suffers
from FS attack, KCI attack and an attack by adversaries who know all users’
secret values, and proposed a simple improvement to remove these flaws. We
also have indicated that Xiong et al.’s protocol [16] cannot resist two types
of KCI attacks and proposed an efficient improvement to remove these flaws.
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